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Abstract: 
 
Agency theory foments the expectation that corporate criminal prosecutions mitigate crime by 
inducing firms to self-regulate. Whether this bears out in reality remains a topic of contentious 
debate. Although the U.S. government began prosecuting firms over a century ago, insufficient 
empirical evidence exists to determine how the costs of prosecutions actually affect firms. 
Moreover, the limited empirical record tells a surprising and somewhat confusing story. Scholars 
of management and related disciplines have consistently found that criminal convictions have 
negligible impacts on shareholder wealth despite theoretical expectations to the contrary. To 
explain these surprising findings and better understand how firms experience the costs of 
prosecutions, I apply agency theory to the criminal prosecution process and propose that each 
legally defined action in that process communicates unique information regarding potential and 
actual agency costs (i.e., sanctions). I also propose that formal convictions appear to elicit no 
reaction from principals because firm responses to early events in the prosecution process, what I 
call “conviction harbingers,” foretell unfavorable verdicts and sanctions well before courts make 
them official. Findings derived from a sample of 177 cases largely confirm my expectations by 
showing that prosecutions cause firm value to decline nearly 11%. In addition to exceeding 
previous estimates by a factor of three, this amount exceeds direct fines by a factor of five (i.e., 
shareholders lost more than $5 of wealth for each dollar of sanctions). I conclude by outlining 
implications of these findings for agency theory, corporate governance, policy, and practice. 
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Article: 
 
FIRST RULE—The evil of the punishment must be made to exceed the advantage of the offense. 
 
(Bentham, 1864/1908: 325) 
 
BP PLC agreed to accept criminal responsibility for the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster that 
killed 11 workers and to pay $4.5 billion in fines and restitution. . . . BP will plead guilty to 11 
felony counts of “seaman’s manslaughter” . . . [and] . . . to one felony count of obstruction of 
Congress . . . [for] . . . false information it gave about the rate that oil was leaking from the well. . 
. . The settlement was announced after the New York Stock Exchange began trading. Shares of 
BP rose 14 cents. (Fowler, 2012) 
 
For over a century, regulators have prosecuted firms like BP for the illegal acts of their 
employees. Lawmakers and law enforcers persist with this practice on the basis of the 
expectation that inflicting financial penalties on firms, or better said, their owners, will motivate 
self-regulation (Khanna, 1996; Macey, 1991). Although this reasoning rests solidly on the same 
logic as theories of agency and corporate governance, scholars have yet to produce empirical 
evidence that imposing agency costs in the form of financial and reputational penalties 
diminishes corporate crime, or even whether it should (i.e., whether the costs of crime 
sufficiently exceed the cost of preventing it; Becker & Stigler, 1974). Rather, scholars of 
management and related quantitative disciplines have consistently found indifferent or even 
positive reactions to criminal convictions, contrary to what agency theory would predict 
(e.g., Davidson & Worrell, 1988; Karpoff & Lott, 1993). 
 
According to agency theory, principals (i.e., shareholders) suffer costs as a result of 
misalignment between their interests and those of their agents (i.e., managers). As applied to 
publicly traded firms, agency theorists have argued and shown that shareholders suffer losses 
because of potential and, even more so, actual agency costs like criminal sanctions (Alexander & 
Cohen, 1999; Campbell, Campbell, Sirmon, Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012). Consistent findings that 
shareholders respond indifferently to criminal convictions are therefore unexpected because 
criminal convictions impose direct agency costs (e.g., sanctions) associated with prosecutions, 
whereas allegations, to which shareholders do respond negatively, communicate only the 
potential for those costs. These unexpected results remain unexplained and leave questions as to 
whether issues with theory or data underlie them (Einstein, 1934). To address these questions, I 
consider the entire criminal prosecution process and how each step in it can impose agency costs. 
 
Considering each step in the prosecution process overcomes a key limitation of previous 
research. Until now, scholars have treated prosecutions as two singular events—allegations and 
convictions. In reality, however, the prosecution process involves several uniquely defined legal 
actions. To better characterize the effect prosecutions have on firm valuations, I apply agency 
theory to each of these actions. This approach leads me to hypothesize that each action triggers 
changes in firm valuations by providing principals new information regarding potential or actual 
agency costs (cf. Campbell et al., 2012). I also posit that formal convictions appear to elicit no 
reaction from principals because firm responses to early events in the prosecution process, what I 
call “conviction harbingers,” often foretell unfavorable verdicts and sanctions well before courts 
make them official. Data from a sample of 177 corporate criminal cases largely validate my 
expectations. Moreover, the findings show that the cost of corporate crime to shareholders is 
more than three times larger than suggested in previous research, which implies that a substantial 
proportion of these agency costs has thus far escaped measurement. 
 
Valid measurement of agency costs has long been a challenge for researchers, particularly in 
contexts defined by law (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000; Orland, 1979). By more accurately measuring 
agency costs imposed by criminal prosecutions, the present research contributes to understanding 
both corporate crime and agency theory in three ways. First, confirming predictions made by 
applying agency theory to a legal context defends agency theory against growing skepticism 
about its predictive validity and calls to reconceptualize it (e.g., Lan & Heracleous, 2010; Pepper 
& Gore, 2015). Second, finding that agency costs imposed by prosecutions occur over several 
critical events, not just one, extends agency theory by suggesting that dispersion over time, like 
dispersion of ownership, complicates their measurement (Ang et al.; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 
2003). Amortizing agency costs this way, moreover, may undermine the very shareholder 
responses (i.e., corporate governance) criminal prosecutions are supposed to induce. Such a 
reality would explain why corporate crime persists despite sanctions that now regularly exceed 
the gross domestic products of small nations. Third, showing that shareholders bear the bulk, if 
not all, of the costs for criminal convictions supports the shareholder primacy view in agency 
theory (Campbell et al., 2012) rather than alternative views (Chassagnon & Hollandts, 2014). In 
this regard, the present research also makes a step towards resolving longstanding debates among 
legal scholars regarding the normative validity of prosecuting firm owners instead of or in 
addition to their malfeasant agents (Arlen, 1994; O’Leary, 2007). Providing new insights into 
how criminal prosecutions affect those principals brings us closer to understanding how they 
actually work (cf. DiMento, Geis, & Gelfand, 2000: 3). 
 
Theoretical Backdrop, Empirical Context, and Hypotheses 
 
Agency Theory and the Economics of Corporate Crime and Punishment 
Agency theory serves as a useful paradigm to understand the economics of corporate crime 
because it often results from and creates conflicts of interests between principals and their 
agents. According to agency theory, two problems naturally occur in relationships between 
principals and agents. The first is the classic agency problem that “arises when (a) the desires or 
goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to 
verify what the agent is actually doing”; the second is “the problem of risk sharing that arises 
when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 58). The 
causes and consequences of corporate crime revolve around both problems. 
 
Corporate crime as an agency problem 
 
In economic terms, corporate crime becomes more likely as its expected benefit exceeds its 
expected cost (i.e., punishment if detected multiplied by the probability thereof; Becker, 1968). 
From this perspective, corporate crime emerges as an unanticipated consequence of common 
attempts to mitigate the aforementioned principal-agent problems. Such approaches 
can inadvertently increase the expected benefit and decrease the expected costs of engaging in 
crime for agents (see Alexander & Cohen, 1999, for a more formalized explanation). For 
instance, outcome-based contracts as a means to mitigate the behavior-verification problem 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) can increase the expected benefits of crime by incentivizing agents to use 
whatever tactics necessary, including illegal ones, to achieve performance goals (Ordóñez, 
Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009). Conversely, contractual clauses intended to mitigate 
agents’ (i.e., managers’) presumed aversion to risk (Eisenhardt) can decrease the expected costs 
of crime, particularly when they indemnify agents against sanctions for criminal activity 
(Margulies, 2006; Mullin & Snyder, 2010; Orland, 1979). In sum, attempts to resolve classic 
agency problems may unintentionally induce another: corporate crime. Although criminal 
activities can certainly advance principals’ material goals, it constitutes an agency problem if 
those activities conflict with principals’ moral desires or risk preferences or become detected 
(Eisenhardt). Detection, in particular, leads to agency costs. 
 
Agency costs as a deterrent to corporate crime 
 
Prosecutions are the mechanism through which corporate crime imposes agency costs 
(Alexander & Cohen, 1999). Most objectively, these agency costs include direct (e.g., criminal 
sanctions) and indirect (e.g., legal fees, time and energy spent responding to charges) burdens on 
accused firms. However, prosecutions also have less objective but equally important reputational 
consequences (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010). These penalties matter tremendously because 
nonmanaging principals and other outside stakeholders rely on reputations (Roberts & Dowling, 
2002), among other signals and information, to manage the risk of doing business with firms and 
their managers (Akerlof, 1970; Milgrom, 1981). Prosecutions undermine reputations by 
providing a significant negative signal that managers of accused firms are either careless or 
malfeasant. Either possibility makes such firms less desirable business partners as a result of 
increased perceived risk (Barnett, 2007; Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009) and transaction costs 
(Jones, 1995). 
 
In normative adherence to the principles of agency theory (Garoupa, 2000; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), regulators impose material and reputational penalties on firms to transfer the cost of 
monitoring and enforcement to them (Miceli & Segerson, 2007). Although the threat of 
sufficiently high costs should motivate members of collectives to monitor and regulate one 
another in theory (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Khanna, 1996), such motivation will 
occur only if the bearers feel and understand those costs. Consistent with this outlook, findings 
by Alexander and Cohen (1999) showed that managers work harder to ensure regulatory 
compliance (i.e., through corporate governance; Schnatterly, 2003) when they stand to bear the 
costs of criminal liability and, conversely, that moral hazards exist when others do. By extension, 
therefore, nonmanaging principals can manage agency costs only to the extent that they 
understand and can measure those costs. 
 
Measuring the agency costs of corporate criminal prosecutions 
 
The unobservable nature of most agency costs, like those imposed by criminal prosecutions, 
makes them difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly (Ang et al., 2000). Thus, researchers 
often use inferential methods or proxy measures, like changes in shareholder wealth (i.e., stock 
performance), to measure agency costs. Changes in shareholder wealth provide a salient and 
valid proxy because shareholders, as principals, are sensitive to both potential and actual agency 
costs (Campbell et al., 2012). A number of researchers have used this approach to measure the 
costs of criminal prosecutions and consistently have found, as expected, a decrease in 
shareholder value consequent to criminal prosecution (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2009). 
Closer inspection of these results, however, reveals a surprising pattern. 
 
Although criminal accusations consistently diminish shareholder wealth, convictions appear to 
have no impact on it. For instance, Davidson and colleagues (Davidson & Worrell, 
1988; Davidson, Worrell, & Lee, 1994) found significant declines in stock performance 
associated with allegations (–0.87%, p < .001) and indictments (e.g., for bribery; –4.25%, p < 
.001) but not convictions. Similarly, Skantz, Cloninger, and Strickland (1990), Karpoff and Lott 
(1993), Reichert, Lockett, and Rao (1996), and Karpoff, Lee, and Vendrzyk (1999) all found that 
accusation-related events had negative impacts on stock performance but convictions did not. 
The apparent lack of reaction to convictions seems surprising in light of the expectations that 
theories of agency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and efficient markets (Fama, 1970) as well as the 
normative presumption of innocence (Husak, 2014) would set. Nevertheless, researchers now 
either aggregate prosecution events into a single category (e.g., Alexander, 1999) or ignore 
conviction events altogether (e.g., Murphy, Shrieves, & Tibbs, 2009; Tibbs, Harrell, & Shrieves, 
2011). 
 
Researchers have offered two explanations for these surprising, yet consistent, results: (1) 
markets reliably anticipate case outcomes (Reichert et al., 1996) or (2) other, unidentified events 
inform the market of impending verdicts (Karpoff & Lott, 1993). Either explanation is 
potentially valid. The former remains tenable because accused firms ultimately plead guilty in 
90% of cases (Apel, 1995; Cohen, 1991), whereas the latter is more consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis (Fama, 1970). Because researchers have yet to confirm either, ambiguity 
remains regarding how criminal prosecutions affect firms. I resolve this ambiguity by more 
thoroughly accounting for the criminal prosecution process and applying agency theory to it. 
 
Agency Costs Imposed by the Corporate Criminal Prosecution Process 
 
The criminal justice process follows a predefined sequence that culminates in the condemnation 
or vindication of the accused.1 Understanding how this process affects firms and their owners 
requires careful consideration of how it unfolds over time and what its component steps 
communicate. As with all irresponsible and undesirable managerial behavior, suspicion and 
evidence of criminal acts made public during these steps inform shareholders of unwelcome risk 
(Barnett, 2007; Godfrey et al., 2009) and the potential for material consequences (i.e., 
diminished future cash flows; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Consistent with this understanding, 
results obtained by Murphy and colleagues demonstrated how increased systematic risk created 
by “uncertainty regarding . . . future legal sanctions, possible restructuring costs, executive 
turnover, or changes in the terms of trade with customers or suppliers” (2009: 56) explains why 
allegations of crime diminish shareholder wealth. Despite the strength of these findings, when 
allegations actually occur and why convictions appear to have no impact on stock performance 
remains uncertain. 
 
This uncertainty persists because researchers typically treat criminal prosecutions as consisting 
of two general events—allegations and convictions—when, in reality, the process unfolds over 
two multistep phases: the accusative phase and the adjudicative phase. Although allegations and 
convictions do respectively occur in these phases, reducing them to one event each may 
oversimplify legal realities in ways that hide the full impact of prosecutions on firms (cf. Cohen, 
1988; Geis & DiMento, 2001; Orland, 1979). As illustrated in Figure 1, each phase involves at 
least three critical events that reveal new information about the potential culpability of an 
accused firm. These events provide insight into managers’ (i.e., agents’) otherwise unobservable 
behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989) and agency costs associated with them (i.e., expected criminal 
sanctions; cf. Becker & Stigler, 1974). In the remainder of this section, therefore, I examine each 
of these critical events more thoroughly by explaining their purposes and predicting, on the basis 
of agency theory, how the information they reveal affects shareholder wealth. 
 
 
Figure 1 The Criminal Prosecution Process and Shareholder Value 
 
Accusative events, agency costs, and shareholder value 
 
In the accusative phase, law enforcement agencies receive and assess criminal accusations to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to pursue a conviction in court. The accusative 
phase includes three critical events: notifications, investigations, and formal charges. To extend 
the precision of previous efforts, I propose that allegations are affirmed when these events are 
first announced by the media as each event informs shareholders of the potential for criminal 
convictions and associated sanctions. 
 
Notifications, labeled A in Figure 1, initiate the criminal prosecution process. Notifications occur 
when victims, witnesses, regulatory agents, or perpetrating firms themselves notify law 
enforcement agencies that wrongdoing has occurred. By providing the first signal that 
malfeasance may have occurred, notifications inform shareholders that the potential for 
convictions and sanctions exists. If law enforcers deem notifications credible, they investigate 
the alleged crimes by interviewing witnesses and suspects as well as collecting material 
evidence. News of these investigations, labeled B in Figure 1, reaffirms the potential for criminal 
convictions and sanctions by signaling that notifications merit the dedication of scarce law 
enforcement resources to resolve them (Becker & Stigler, 1974). Upon conclusion, law 
enforcement agencies submit the results of investigations to prosecutors, typically district or U.S. 
attorneys who, in turn, decide whether to pursue formal charges. Depending on the jurisdiction, 
accused firms are formally charged either when prosecutors file the charges or when grand 
juries—independent bodies of ordinary citizens (i.e., grand jurors)—determine that sufficient 
evidence exists to convict the accused and return an indictment.2 In either case, formal charges, 
labeled C in Figure 1, further affirm the legitimacy of the original accusation (i.e., at notification) 
and the potential for convictions and sanctions. 
 
In contrast to previous approaches, therefore, this more fine-grained understanding of the 
accusative phase suggests that criminal allegations come not in one but three forms. Each form—
notification, investigation, and formal charges—provides information regarding the probability 
of conviction and associated sanctions. Given that shareholders account for potential and real 
agency costs in stock valuations (Campbell et al., 2012), shareholder wealth should vary in 
proportion to expected sanctions, that is, the product of the perceived probability of conviction 
and anticipated penalty if convicted (Becker, 1968). In sum, 
 
• Hypothesis 1a: Notification events (A) lead to diminished stock performance due to 
increased probability of criminal conviction and expected sanctions. 
• Hypothesis 1b: Investigation events (B) lead to diminished stock performance due to 
increased probability of criminal conviction and expected sanctions. 
• Hypothesis 1c: Formal charge events (C) lead to diminished stock performance due to 
increased probability of criminal conviction and expected sanctions. 
 
Exploring market anticipation of case resolutions 
 
The foregoing predictions that the three separate accusative-phase events each affect stock 
performance naturally lead to questions regarding the relations between these effects. Although 
no theory or evidence, to my knowledge, provides for specific predictions in this respect, the 
relations between market reactions to accusative events are relevant to Reichert et al.’s 
(1996)conjecture that the market anticipates case outcomes. If the market anticipates and ignores 
convictions, then it must reliably account for them earlier in the prosecution process. Systematic 
anticipation should then be evidenced by dependence between market reactions to the various 
steps in the prosecution process. Such dependence would manifest itself in one of two plausible, 
but opposite, ways. The market would either (1) respond with extreme pessimism to allegations, 
reacting strongest to initial criminal accusations (i.e., notifications) and decreasingly so to 
subsequent events (i.e., investigations and formal charges), or (2) respond with cautious 
pessimism, reacting weakest to initial accusations and increasingly negatively with the 
succession of each accusative event. Consequently, formal charges would systematically elicit 
either the weakest or the strongest market responses. Either scenario would demonstrate that the 
market ignores convictions because it would have already accounted for them in its reactions to 
accusative events. These alternative possibilities provide for two competing hypotheses: 
 
• Hypothesis 2: Accusative-phase events (A, B, and C) have decreasingly negative impacts 
on stock performance. 
• Hypothesis 3: Accusative-phase events (A, B, and C) have increasingly negative impacts 
on stock performance. 
 
Disconfirming both hypotheses would imply independence between reactions to accusation-
phase events (i.e., that markets do not anticipate convictions during the accusative phase). 
 
Adjudicative events, agency costs, and shareholder value 
 
In the adjudicative stage, an independent judiciary hears criminal charges and allows the 
prosecution and defense (i.e., the accused) to present their respective cases. The former enters 
criminal charges and evidence, whereas the latter can respond by accepting or refuting them. 
This phase continues until the court reaches a verdict and, if applicable, sentences the accused. 
Like the accusative phase, three critical events occur during the adjudicative phase—conviction 
harbingers, convictions, and sentencing—that communicate distinct and important information 
to shareholders. 
 
I define conviction harbingers (labeled D in Figure 1) as the earliest response to a criminal 
allegation that makes conviction and sanctions nearly certain. Conviction harbingers, as such, 
constitute the “unknown events” that Karpoff and Lott (1993) suspected inform the market of 
impending verdicts and penalties. Although not defined by law, I base conviction harbingers in 
three legal realities. First, accused firms always respond to informal (i.e., notifications or 
investigations) and formal charges in some way. The former elicits public assumptions of 
responsibility, proclamations of innocence, or silence, whereas the latter requires (normally 
during a procedure called an arraignment3) the accused to plead guilty, not guilty, or no 
contest.4Second, half of these potential responses—accepting charges or refusing to fight them—
virtually guarantee conviction and sanctions. Third, 90% of formally charged firms ultimately 
take responsibility for criminal charges (Apel, 1995; Cohen, 1991). 
 
Conviction harbingers come in three common forms. In many cases, prosecutors or accused 
firms (e.g., Reuters, 1997) announce an impending or finalized plea-bargain agreement signaling 
that the accused will enter a guilty plea in court. Although less direct, other accused firms 
announce by way of filings with Securities and Exchange Commission that they have taken a 
charge against earnings to account for legal costs, including sanctions. Finally, coconspiring 
employees or firms can remove the possibility of a successful legal defense by pleading guilty 
before the accused firm does (e.g., Sniffen, 1998). Such admissions not only virtually guarantee 
conviction in prisoner-dilemma fashion but also often provide concrete bases for anticipating and 
estimating costs of convictions (e.g., coconspirators’ negotiated sanctions, charges against 
earnings, and settlements). In accordance with recent extensions of agency theory (Campbell et 
al., 2012), shareholder sensitivity to these virtually certain agency costs (i.e., expected sanctions) 
should manifest in stock performance leading to diminished shareholder wealth. 
 
• Hypothesis 4: Conviction harbingers (D) lead to diminished stock performance by 
increasing expected sanctions, that is, by making criminal convictions virtually certain 
and associated sanctions estimable. 
The next two critical events in the adjudicative phase are dependent. Verdicts refer to the final 
disposition of the case, whereas sentences refer to court-mandated punishments. Verdicts come 
in two types—the court either convicts and declares the accused guilty or acquits and finds the 
accused not guilty. Convictions (labeled E in Figure 1) occur when judges formally accept a plea 
of guilty or no contest, whereas acquittals and convictions can occur on the basis of the decision 
of judges or juries5 at the conclusion of a trial. Sentencing (labeled F in Figure 1) occurs only 
following convictions. Courts impose sentences either immediately following (i.e., during the 
same hearing as) convictions or in separate hearings days or weeks later. Although conviction 
harbingers should enable shareholders to anticipate convictions and, to some extent, sentences, 
they do not occur in every case. Absent such an event, unanticipated convictions should provide 
new information to shareholders and induce the same change in shareholder wealth as conviction 
harbingers do, and for the same reasons. 
 
• Hypothesis 5: Unanticipated convictions (E) lead to diminished stock performance by 
increasing expected sanctions, that is, by making criminal convictions certain and the 
associated sanctions known or estimable. 
 
New questions 
 
The foregoing still fails to account for anticipated convictions (i.e., those preceded by conviction 
harbingers) and sentences. Although previous findings suggest that these events have no impact 
on stock performance, other possibilities remain. For instance, if courts regularly reduce 
sanctions negotiated during plea bargaining, stock prices may rise as a result of the difference 
between the anticipated and actual sanctions. In the absence of theoretical and empirical 
precedents, I treat these possibilities as open research questions: 
 
• Research Question 1: How do anticipated formal convictions (E) affect stock 
performance? 
• Research Question 2: How does criminal sentencing (F) affect stock performance? 
• Research Question 3: Do differences between anticipated and actual sanctions explain 
the impact of conviction-related events (E and F) on stock performance? 
 
Method 
 
To test my hypotheses, I conducted event studies for each event in the prosecution process. 
Event-study methods enable measuring the effects of unanticipated events (e.g., CEO turnover, 
layoffs, plant closures, changes in legislation) on stock prices and are powerful for examining the 
relationship between firms’ social and financial performance because (1) they constitute quasi-
experiments by estimating the difference between actual and expected performance had the 
events not occurred and (2) these differences are less easily manipulated by managers than 
strictly accounting-based measures of profit (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
 
To conduct my event studies, I adopted the 10-step process outlined by McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997: 652). The opening two sections of the present study accomplish their 1st, 2nd, and 9th 
steps: (1) “define an event that provides new information to the market,” (2) “outline a theory 
that justifies a financial response to this new information,” and (9) “outline a theory that explains 
the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns” (652). The rest of this section explains my 
implementation of the remaining steps except for the 10th one. Their 10th step is to include the 
sample in an appendix. Given its size, I have opted to make my sample available upon request. 
 
Firm and Event Identification 
 
The third step in an event study is to “identify a set of firms that experience [the] event and 
identify the event dates” (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997: 652). To do so, trained assistants and I 
searched the Factiva database for news of corporate criminal prosecutions published between the 
implementations of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations in 1991 (Dalton, 
Metzger, & Hill, 1994) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. We retained only those cases 
involving corporations whose shares traded publicly in the United States. I validated this process 
by confirming it returned all the cases in the Corporate Crime Reporter’s “Top 100 Corporate 
Criminals of the Decade” (Mokhiber, 1999). At least two members of the data-collection team 
then reconstructed case timelines by searching for news of notification (labeled A in Figure 1), 
investigation (B), formal charge (C), conviction harbinger (D), conviction (E), and sentencing 
(F) events. I compared the results of each person and resolved discrepancies by checking the 
records against the actual news reports. The initial sample included 280 cases. 
 
To ensure the validity of my sample and results, I removed 68 cases that involved only civil 
violations (see Orland, 1979). I also dropped 31 cases that had less than US$100,000 in 
sanctions, as such small penalties suggest minor crimes and negligible effects on shareholder 
wealth (Cohen, 1991; Karpoff et al., 1999; Lott, 1996). Finally, I eliminated 4 cases in which the 
firms had declared bankruptcy because the consequences of their legal infractions would likely 
both be overshadowed by their imminent failures or deferred by the courts. The resultant final 
sample included 177 cases yielding 40 notification events (A), 92 investigation events (B), 51 
formal charges (C), 76 conviction harbingers (D), 169 convictions (E), and 41 sentencing events 
(F). Unexpectedly, I found the media reported anticipated formal charges (i.e., that an indictment 
was expected, but not finalized) in 26 cases. I included these events (C) as well. 
 
Event-Window Specification 
 
The fourth step is to “choose an appropriate event window and justify its length” (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997: 652). The event window is the time period during which the market reaction is 
expected to have occurred. As a slight departure from the standard 2-day window that starts the 
day of the event and ends the next, we specified windows that began the day of the event and 
ended the first day it was announced in a major news outlet (e.g., the Wall Street Journal, 
the New York Times). Although first reports did often occur the following day, we found cases in 
which they occurred the same day or lagged by several days. To further ensure precision, we 
confirmed that dates and days of the week in articles matched. When they did not, we studied the 
articles more closely or compared with others to confirm the correct date. 
 
Confounds 
 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) recommended identifying potential event confounds as a fifth 
step. Event confounds included any coinciding news that might artificially exaggerate or 
suppress results by inducing another market reaction. To identify confounds, trained assistants 
searched for news about the firm for each event starting 1 day before the event window began 
and ending the last day thereof. I confirmed confounds and classified them by their expected 
impact: negative (e.g., negative earnings surprises, being sued), positive (e.g., acquiring new 
sources of revenue), or uncertain (e.g., countervailing confounds, reorganization, or merger or 
acquisition announcements). In summary, we identified 13 (2 negative, 6 positive, and 5 
uncertain) confounds for notification events (A), 12 (1 negative, 5 positive, and 6 uncertain) for 
investigations (B), 6 (2 negative, 1 positive, and 3 uncertain) for anticipated charges (C), 14 (2 
negative, 8 positive, and 4 uncertain) for formal charges (C), 23 (7 negative, 11 positive, and 5 
uncertain) for conviction harbingers (D), 34 (3 negative, 18 positive, and 13 uncertain) for 
convictions (E), and 6 (1 negative, 3 positive, and 2 uncertain) for sentencing events (F). 
 
Stock Performance 
 
The sixth step is to “compute abnormal returns . . . and test their significance” (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997: 652). Abnormal returns refer to the unexpected change in the stock price during a 
trading day. For multiday windows, it is proper to summate them in cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs; McWilliams & Siegel). I calculated CARs with Eventus 8.0 (Cowan, 2005) and used all 
but two default options: (1) I excluded dividends from the returns because they should be 
factored into stock prices (Davidson & Worrell, 1988), and (2) I used value-weighted indices, 
rather than equal weighted, to account for heterogeneity in my sample. I verified the robustness 
of my results by computing precision-weighted average abnormal returns (PWARs). PWARs 
provide more valid population estimates because each CAR is weighted inversely to its 
estimation-window variance (A. R. Cowan, personal communication, November 3, 2011). 
 
I evaluated statistical significance four ways to compensate for common problems with event-
study data (Binder, 1998). Patell’s (1976) Z and the standardized cross-sectional Z (Boehmer, 
Musumeci, & Poulsen, 1991) established whether the average CAR was statistically different 
from 0. The former compensates for heteroskedasticity by standardizing the abnormal return, 
whereas the latter compensates for unequal variance between estimation and event time periods. 
Because increased variance associated with focal events, outliers, and thinly traded stocks can 
violate the assumptions underlying both Z tests, I also used the nonparametric generalized sign 
and rank tests, which are robust to such violations (Cowan, 1992). 
 
Unlike most sign tests, which test against a 50-50 null hypothesis, the generalized sign test 
compares the proportion of positive returns associated with an event against the proportion of 
positive returns during a period not associated with the event (i.e., the estimation period). In 
contrast, the rank test treats estimation- and event-window returns as part of a common set and 
assigns ranks to each return (the lowest return has a rank of 1). The ranks of the event-window 
returns are then compared with the null hypothesis that the event-window-related ranks are equal 
to the average rank for the returns across both windows. These tests complement each other as 
the rank test is more powerful for detecting abnormal returns for short (1 or 2 days) event 
windows, whereas the generalized sign test is better specified for stocks traded on the NASDAQ; 
both tests are equally well suited for stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the 
American Stock Exchange (Cowan, 1992). 
 
Reporting the foregoing results and using bootstrap methods for small samples are the seventh 
and eighth steps, respectively. I present them in the Results section. 
Econometric Validation 
 
Completing Step 9 required econometric validation of my hypotheses. I validated Hypothesis 1 
by confirming that change in systematic risk mediated the effects that accusative events have on 
stock performance (see Murphy et al., 2009). I validated Hypotheses 4 and 5 by confirming that 
estimated and actual sanctions respectively mediated the effects of prosecution events on market 
reactions. The quasi-experimental nature of event studies, however, required I use an abbreviated 
form of mediation analysis to complete validation of these hypotheses. 
 
Because the independent variables in my study are invariant (i.e., it is impossible to consider a 
nonevent in this type of analysis), my mediation tests involved only one step. That step was to 
estimate regression models including the mediator and control variables as the independent 
variables and the abnormal returns as the dependent variables. I used weighted-least-squares 
(WLS) regression models using weights generated by Eventus. First, WLS allows for inclusion 
of all observations, including extreme ones, by adjusting for differences in population variances. 
The alternative would be to eliminate extreme observations on the basis of arbitrary cutoffs. As 
noted by McWilliams and Siegel (1997), doing so is undesirable because it may exclude relevant 
market reactions. Second, it adjusts all variables in the model, not just the dependent one. 
Researchers often standardized CARs, but this approach “is essentially performing only half of 
the [WLS] correction” (A. R. Cowan, personal communication, July 30, 2012). 
 
I defined and measured change in firm risk and adjusted actual and anticipated sanctions as 
mediator variables and book-to-market ratio and change in quarterly return on assets (ROA) as 
control variables. 
 
Change in firm risk 
 
I explored whether criminal notifications (A), investigations (B), and formal charges (C) led to 
diminished stock performance, as predicted in Hypothesis 1, as a result of increased systematic 
risk. Like Murphy et al. (2009), I measured change in risk as the change in average standard 
deviations for daily stock returns over the 250-day periods ending 10 days before and starting 10 
days after each event. 
 
Adjusted actual and anticipated sanctions 
 
Prosecutions impose direct material costs on firms when they result in sanctions (i.e., fines, 
reparations, and court costs). Although courts impose sanctions only after formal declaration of 
guilt, markets may anticipate their magnitude. Accusative-phase (A, B, and C) and conviction 
harbinger (D) events often facilitate anticipation by including analysts’ estimates of, speculation 
regarding, or actual agreed upon settlements. To test my fourth and fifth hypotheses, therefore, 
my team and I recorded official sanctions imposed at formal conviction (E) or sentencing (F) as 
well as anticipated sanctions reported preceding those events. If the media reported more than 
one anticipated sanction, I used the one reported closest in time to the official sanction. To 
establish their relative per-share impact, I divided both anticipated and actual sanctions by 
market capitalization the day before each event and log-transformed the quotients to correct for 
extreme right skew (Murphy et al., 2009). 
 
Control variables 
 
Following Murphy et al. (2009), I included book-to-market ratio and change in quarterly ROA as 
control variables for each event. I estimated book-to-market ratio as each firm’s total assets less 
its total liabilities and preferred stock all divided by its market capitalization the day before the 
event. I estimated change in quarterly ROA as the difference between income divided by total 
assets the quarter of and the quarter before the event. 
 
Results 
 
Prior to testing my hypotheses, I explored how confounds might affect my findings. A 
disproportionate number of positive confounds as compared with negative confounds suggested 
the potential for bias. Of 106 identified confounds, 52 (49.06%) were positive, 18 were negative 
(16.98%), and 36 (33.96%) were uncertain. The difference between positive and negative 
confounds was statistically significant (Z = 4.93, p < .001). This pattern persisted across the 
events in the prosecution process with only anticipated charges having more negative (2) 
confounds than positive (1). These findings do not necessarily explain lack of market reaction to 
formal convictions (E), however. Formal convictions (E) had a proportion of positive confounds 
comparable to the other events, excepting anticipated charges (C), and the third lowest 
percentage of total confounds (20.12%) overall. 
 
Next, I calculated the CARs and PWARs and tested the significance of the former. Overall, the 
significance of CARs increased and the difference between CARs and PWARs decreased when I 
excluded confounded events. Hence, I report only results with confounds excluded hereafter. As 
seen in Table 1, criminal prosecutions led stock performance to decline 1.47% overall. 
Consistent with previous studies, results showed that accusative (i.e., allegation) rather than 
conviction (E) events appear to drive this decline. The small difference between the overall CAR 
and the PWAR (–1.57%) as well as the consistency between parametric and nonparametric tests 
(Patell Z = -12.08, standardized cross-sectional Z = -6.34, generalized sign Z = -5.23, rank 
test Z = -5.63, all ps < .001) show these findings result from a general effect rather than extreme 
observations. Going forward, I mention only the traditional CARs and Patell Z statistics unless a 
notable discrepancy exists between the various statistics estimated. 
 
Table 1 Criminal Prosecution Multiple Event Study 
 
Event Type Abnormal 
Return 
(%) 
Precision 
Weighted 
(%) 
N Patell Za Standardized 
Cross- 
Sectional Za 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
Rank 
Test Z 
Notifications 
All -6.29 -3.58 27 -8.84** -2.91** -2.64** -.2.38* 
No 
Disclosures 
-6.29 -3.51 21 -.7.79** -2.46** -2.56* -2.22* 
Investigations 
First 
Announced 
-3.70 -3.07 79 -10.72*** -6.01*** -3.94*** -
4.76*** 
Formal Charges 
Anticipated -3.31 -4.05 20 -7.79† -2.11* -1.58 -
4.81*** 
Actual -4.26 -2.60 37 -4.35*** -3.86*** -2.28* -
4.26*** 
Combined -3.96 -2.63 54b -7.92*** -3.23** -2.48* -
6.24*** 
Conviction Harbingers 
First 
Announced 
-2.14 -1.96 53 -5.83*** -3.23** -3.22** -
3.66*** 
Convictions 
All 0.02 -0.01 135 -0.03 -0.03 -1.22 -2.77** 
Anticipated 1.56 1.26 66 3.65*** 3.02** 2.21* -0.51 
Unanticipated -1.45 -1.12 69 -3.61*** -3.37*** -3.87*** -3.01** 
Final Sentencing 
First 
Announced 
6.40 0.43 35 0.93 0.68 0.43 1.95 
Combined 
Overall 
-1.47 -1.57 381 -12.08*** -6.34*** -5.23*** -
5.63*** 
aTest statistics based on bootstrapped analyses for sample sizes smaller than 30. 
bExcludes formal charges for three cases because anticipated charges were also announced. 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
The respective event studies provide initial support of my main hypotheses. As predicted by 
Hypothesis 1a, notification events (A) induced significant abnormal returns. Considering that 
self-reports of wrongdoing might constitute conviction harbingers (i.e., confessing before being 
charged; D), I examined notification events with them included and excluded. The average 
CARs were identical (Ms = −6.29%, Patell Zs = −8.84 and −7.79, ps < .01). Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1b, results showed that announced criminal investigations (B) also had a negative 
impact on stock performance (M = −3.70%, Patell Z = −10.72, p < .001). I also found, in support 
of Hypothesis 1c, that both anticipated and actual formal charges (C) triggered declines in stock 
performance (Ms = −3.31% and −4.26%, Patell Zs = −7.79 and −4.35, ps < .10 and .001, 
respectively). The media reported both types of events in only three cases, so I combined results, 
including only the anticipated event when both were reported (M = -3.96%, Patell Z = -7.92, p < 
.001). In support of Hypothesis 4, conviction harbingers (D) led to diminished stock performance 
(M = -2.14%, Patell Z = -5.83, p < .001) and also appeared to influence the impact of conviction 
events (E). In confirmation of Hypothesis 5, unanticipated convictions (i.e., those not preceded 
by a harbinger event) led to negative abnormal returns (M = -1.45%, Patell Z = -3.61, p < .001). 
 
The event-study results also inform Research Questions 1 and 2. With respect to the former, it 
appears that anticipated convictions (E) led to positive abnormal returns (M = 1.56%, Patell Z = 
3.65, p < .001). Although it appears that sentencing events (F) also led to improved stock 
performance (M = 6.40%, Patell Z = 0.93, n.s.), the nonsignificant test statistics and substantially 
smaller PWAR (0.43%) suggest that these returns suffer from wide variance. 
 
Next, I tested my competing explanations for how preconviction events may affect shareholder 
wealth. I examined whether there were any mean differences between the accusative-phase 
events (A, B, and C) that would suggest decreasing or increasing market reactions as predicted 
by Hypotheses 2 and 3, respectively. Although the mean for notification events (M = -
6.29%, SD= 0.14) was more negative than the means for investigations (M = -3.70%, SD = 0.07) 
and formal charges (M = -3.96%, SD = 0.11), the differences were not significant, F(2, 157) = 
0.76, p = .468. Given that this test was conservative, I examined the differences between means 
for events that were and were not preceded by other announcements. I separated and recalculated 
the CARs for investigation, formal charge, and conviction events for which I found and did not 
find preceding announcements (i.e., investigation events with corresponding notification events, 
formal charges with corresponding notification or investigation events, etc.). As shown in Table 
2, the general pattern of findings remained the same, and the means again were not significantly 
different in each case. Thus, these results confirm neither Hypothesis 2 nor Hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 2 The Effect of Preceding Announcements 
Event Type Preced
ed 
Abnormal 
Return 
(%) 
Precision 
Weighted 
(%) 
N Patell 
Za 
Standardized 
Cross- 
Sectional Za 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
Rank 
Test Z 
Investigations Yes -5.74 -5.72 -6.28** -6.28** -4.30** -3.57*** -4.23*** 
 No -3.07 -6.74 -
8.58*** 
-
8.58*** 
-4.53*** -2.23* -3.80*** 
Formal Charges Yes -3.00 -3.24 -7.23* -7.23* -2.26* -1.37** -5.15*** 
 No -4.99 -2.77 -3.89** -3.89** -3.22** -2.14* -3.43*** 
Convictions Yes 0.45 -1.41 0.34 0.34 0.27 -1.00 -3.43*** 
 No -1.07 -0.60 -0.60 -0.60 -0.53 -0.70 0.16 
aSignificance levels based on bootstrapped analyses for sample sizes smaller than 30. 
*p < .05.**p < .01.***p < .001. 
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics and biserial correlations for the variables needed to test 
my mediation hypotheses. Table 4 reports the WLS-estimated regression models for accusative-
phase (A, B, and C) events. For each event, I estimated two models to determine whether the 
negative reactions to them were due to increased risk or actual sanctions. Consistent with 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, results showed that increased risk explained negative declines in stock 
performance in response to notifications (β = -0.44, p = .055) and investigations (β = -0.28, p = 
.029). Because sanctions also explained some variance (βs = -0.59 and −0.33, ps = .047 and .017, 
respectively), I tested which explained more by standardizing all the variables, reestimating the 
regression models, and comparing the two coefficients in the new models. In both cases, change 
in risk was more influential (bs = -0.49 and −0.28) than final sanctions (bs = -0.25 and −0.25) but 
not significantly so (Fs = 1.29 and 0.03, ps = .272 and .875, respectively). Thus, it appears that 
both changes in risk and anticipation of sanctions explain the impact of notifications (A) and 
investigations (B) on shareholder wealth. 
 
Table 3 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 N M SD 
Notifications 
1. Abnormal 
Return 
—      27 –6.29% 0.14 
2. Book-to-
Market Ratio 
–.32 —     24 0.28 0.20 
3. Δ Quarterly 
ROA 
.08 –.10 —    24 0.01 0.01 
4. Δ Risk –.88*** .01 .09 —   27 0.01 0.02 
5. Sanctions –.56** .49* –.17 .35† —  24 1.88 1.88 
6. Anticipated 
Sanctions 
–.60* .29 –.15 .32 .96 — 15 2.23 2.00 
Investigations 
1. Abnormal 
Return 
—      79 –3.70% 0.07 
2. Book-to-
Market Ratio 
.07 —     68 0.31 0.41 
3. Δ Quarterly 
ROA 
.00 –.14 —    68 0.01 0.04 
4. Δ Risk .02 .08 –.46*** —   79 0.00 0.01 
5. Sanctions –.16 .25 –.30* .23† —  68 2.01 2.07 
6. Anticipated 
Sanctions 
–.06 .17 –.27 .19 .88*** — 36 2.61 2.02 
Formal Charges 
1. Abnormal 
Return 
—      54 –3.96% 0.11 
2. Book-to-
Market Ratio 
–.63*** —     46 0.42 0.86 
3. Δ Quarterly 
ROA 
–.08 .00 —    46 0.00 0.06 
4. Δ Risk –.30* .30* .15 —   54 0.05 0.03 
5. Sanctions –.27 † .41** .16 .18 —  48 1.59 2.56 
6. Anticipated 
Sanctions 
–.46** .46** –.03 .18 .85*** — 36 1.95 2.37 
Conviction Harbingers 
1. Abnormal 
Return 
—      53 –2.14% 0.06 
2. Book-to-
Market Ratio 
.03 —     48 0.24 0.58 
3. Δ Quarterly 
ROA 
.16 –.23  
— 
   46 0.03 0.15 
4. Δ Risk –.23† –.11 .10 —   53 0.00 0.01 
5. Sanctions –.08 .12 .17 –.11 —  49 1.89 2.05 
6. Anticipated 
Sanctions 
–.23 .12 .22 .08 .95*** — 31 2.30 2.24 
Unanticipated Convictions 
1. Abnormal 
Return 
—      69 –1.45% 0.09 
2. Book-to-
Market Ratio 
–.17 —     54 0.91 8.77 
3. Δ Quarterly 
ROA 
.37** .32* —    51 0.01 0.05 
4. Δ Risk .57*** .70*** .33* —   69 0.01 0.08 
5. Sanctions .10 .24 .14 .26* —  64 0.90 2.58 
6. Δ Sanctions –.03 .63 .08 –.01 –.18 — 23 –0.05 1.33 
Anticipated Convictions 
1. Abnormal 
Return 
—      66 1.56% 0.05 
2. Book-to-
Market Ratio 
.13 —     58 0.25 0.57 
3. Δ Quarterly 
ROA 
.02 –.02 —    58 –0.03 0.33 
4. Δ Risk –.46*** –.15 –.10 —   66 0.02 0.01 
5. Sanctions .13 .12 .20 .23† —  66 1.88 2.41 
6. Δ Sanctions .07 .18 –.03 –.29† –.08 — 42 –0.14 0.73 
Sentencing 
1. Abnormal 
Return 
—      35 6.40% 0.34 
2. Book-to-
Market Ratio 
.06 —     26 0.09 0.59 
3. Δ Quarterly 
ROA 
–.12 .08 —    27 –0.01 0.05 
4. Δ Risk –.11 .05 .02 —   35 0.00 0.02 
5. Sanctions .54** .48** –.04 –.01 —  30 1.29 2.43 
6. Δ Sanctions .09 –.33 –.21 –.49* .05 — 21 –0.51 1.21 
Note: ROA = return on assets. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Table 4 Explaining Abnormal Returns for Accusative-Phase Events 
 Weighted-Least-Squares Regression Models 
 Notificationsa Investigations Formal Chargesb 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Intercept –0.01 0.00 –0.02*** –0.02* –0.01 –0.02† –0.01 –0.00 
Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
–75.94 –1.57 –1.40 7.00 –20.25 12.01 –15.02  
Δ Quarterly ROA 0.14 0.04 –0.03 –0.07 0.00 0.05 –0.03  
Δ Risk –3.30† –3.44† –1.39* –1.52* –1.81 –1.90 –3.47* –3.70** 
Adjusted 
Anticipated 
Sanctions 
      –0.02† –0.02† 
Adjusted Actual 
Sanctions 
 –0.01*  –0.01*  –
0.01*** 
0.00 0.01 
R2 .29 .45 .08 .21 .07 .27 .40 .34 
N 24 19 66 60 44 48 24 31 
F 2.71† 2.86† 1.80 3.57* 0.96 3.91** 2.37† 4.60** 
Note: ROA = return on assets. aIncluding disclosure events. bCombined anticipated and actual 
charges. †p < .10. *p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
In contrast, only actual sanctions explained the impact of formal charges (C; β = -0.50, p = .001) 
on stock performance. Although their effect is not consistent with Hypothesis 1c, estimated 
liabilities may have influenced this outcome. Thirty-two (59.23%) of the 54 formal charge 
announcements included estimated sanctions, whereas only 5 (4.72%) of the preceding 106 
allegation events did. Because final sanctions highly correlate with anticipated sanctions (r = 
.67, p < .001), I included anticipated sanctions in a third regression model to determine whether 
they explained the significant role of final sanctions in Model 2. Indeed, the coefficient for 
anticipated sanctions remained moderately significant, but the coefficient for total sanctions did 
not (βs = -0.64 and −0.16, ps = .079 and .651, respectively). Moreover, the coefficient for total 
risk became significant (β = -0.43, p = .033). Because of the low ratio of observations to 
variables, I estimated a fourth model that excluded the control variables. The pattern of results 
was identical except that the overall model was now significant (F = 4.60, p = .010) and the 
coefficient for change in risk was more so (β = -0.46, p = .007), further validating support for 
Hypothesis 1c. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of regression analyses for the adjudicative-phase events (D, E, and F) 
controlling for book-to-market ratio and change in quarterly ROA. I estimated the variance 
explained by change in risk and either anticipated sanctions or actual sanctions as appropriate 
and the difference between them. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, results showed that anticipated 
sanctions significantly explained change in stock performance due to conviction harbingers (D), 
whereas actual sanctions did not (βs = -0.46 and 0.15, ps = .015 and .329, respectively). In 
contrast to and limited support of Hypothesis 5, actual sanctions moderately explained 
diminished stock performance in response to unanticipated convictions (E; βs = -0.26, p = .078). 
 
Table 5 Explaining Criminal Abnormal Returns for Adjudicative-Phase Events 
 Weighted-Least-Squares Regression Models 
 Conviction 
Harbinger 
Unanticipated 
Conviction 
Anticipated 
Conviction 
Sentencing 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Intercept 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.00 
Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
3.73 -3.12 -1.24 -45.67 15.07† 10.50 9.85 2.49 
Δ Quarterly 
ROA 
-0.07 -0.10 0.14† 0.16 0.01 0.01 -0.11 -0.11 
Δ Risk -1.74 -1.19 -0.07 -0.68 -0.50 -1.07 -0.45 0.10 
Adjusted 
Anticipated 
Sanctions 
-0.01*        
Adjusted Actual 
Sanctions 
 0.00 0.00†      
Adjusted Δ 
Sanctions 
   0.00  -0.02†  -0.00 
R2 .42 .16 .13 .20 .07 .12 .14 .13 
N 28 45 49 17 58 35 26 16 
F 4.10* 1.92 1.70 0.77 1.36 1.03 1.23 0.41 
Note: ROA = return on assets. †p < .10. *p < .05. 
 
Finally, and in response to Research Question 3, the difference between actual and anticipated 
sanctions moderately explained the change in stock performance associated with anticipated 
convictions (E; β = -0.33, p = .079) but not unanticipated convictions (E) or sentencing events 
(F; βs = -0.07 and −0.19, ps = .804 and .552, respectively). 
 
To put the significance of the foregoing findings into perspective, consider their implications for 
a hypothetical firm with a market capitalization of $1 billion. Using previous methods to 
estimate the impact on this firm’s worth leads to the conclusion that the firm’s value would 
decline 3.54% (the average impact of the accusative-phase events—notification, investigation, 
and formal charge; A, B, and C) to $965 million in response to criminal allegations and remain 
unchanged after conviction. Use of the updated measurement approach proposed in the present 
research, in contrast, leads to the conclusion that the firm’s value would decline 3.58% to $964 
million in response to a notification event (A), another 3.07% to $935 million following the 
announcement of an investigation (B), 3.96% more to $896 million once formally charged (C), 
and, finally, another 1.96% to $880 million once the firm responds in a way that implies it will 
take responsibility (i.e., following the conviction harbinger; D). Even after one accounts for the 
unexpected favorable market response to anticipated convictions (E) that would cause firm value 
to go back up by 1.26% to $891 million, the overall loss in shareholder wealth is at least three 
times larger ($109 million vs. $35 million) than previous estimation methods would suggest. 
 
Although not focal to the present research, the data also inform what others consider the 
“reputational penalty” of prosecutions (Greve et al., 2010). Reputational penalty refers to the 
shareholder losses that exceed direct financial penalties (i.e., sanctions). Estimating the total 
shareholder losses and subtracting the total direct fines thus gives the reputational penalty. In the 
present sample, the prosecution process led to a total loss of shareholder wealth of US$26.6 
billion in response to US$4.96 billion of direct fines and other penalties. In sum, then, 
shareholders lost more than $5 of wealth for each $1 of direct fines. 
 
Discussion 
 
For over a century, regulators have prosecuted firms for corporate crimes on the basis of 
premises that underlie theories of agency and corporate governance. For nearly as long, scholars, 
lawyers, and politicians have debated the legitimacy of this practice (Arlen, 1994; Friedman, 
1999; Khanna, 1996). Despite extensive attempts to inform this debate by a wide range of legal, 
economic, and organizational scholars, “no one knows how it really works because there is a 
dearth of empirical information about its effects” (DiMento et al., 2000: 3). As is common when 
attempting to understand agency costs, valid and accurate measurement has remained a major 
challenge (Ang et al., 2000; Campbell et al., 2012). I have addressed this challenge as it pertains 
to the cost of criminal prosecutions by accounting for the entire prosecution process and applying 
agency theory to it. This approach has facilitated better understanding of the agency costs that 
criminal prosecutions impose and, thus, resolving extant empirical ambiguities. 
 
Until now, corporate-crime researchers have treated the prosecution process as two general 
events: allegations and convictions. This dichotomization led to consistent findings that the 
former regularly impose agency costs on shareholders but, counter to theoretical expectations, 
the latter do not. In contrast, I have shown that considering each step in the criminal prosecution 
facilitates a more thorough characterization of the agency costs prosecuted firms experience. 
Doing so has clarified previous findings in three regards. First, allegations come in three legally 
distinct types—notifications (A), investigations (B), and formal charges (C)—each of which has 
unique and independent impacts on shareholder wealth. Second, both conviction harbingers (D) 
and offsetting reactions to anticipated and unanticipated convictions (E) explain apparent market 
indifference to convictions. Third, and extending the work of Murphy et al. (2009), systematic 
risk gives way to anticipated sanctions as the factor explaining diminished shareholder wealth as 
criminal prosecutions unfold. Specifically, increased risk explains the impact of notification (A) 
and investigation (B) events on stock performance, whereas anticipated sanctions, actual 
sanctions, and differences between them explain the impacts of formal charges (C), conviction 
harbingers (D), and unanticipated convictions (E). 
 
Taken as a whole, the results herein validate Orland’s (1979) concern that imprecise use of legal 
concepts would lead to misleading conclusions. Indeed, the present findings demonstrate that 
convictions do diminish shareholder wealth and that the overall cost of criminal prosecutions is 
much greater than previously thought. Although a perfectly precise estimation still remains out 
of reach, my findings suggest that the actual impact of prosecutions on stock performance could 
easily exceed 10%. Of these losses, 80% constitute what others have called reputational effects 
(i.e., the percentage of loss that exceeds the direct financial penalties imposed; Greve et al., 
2010). All these outcomes have important implications for research, policy, and practice. 
 
Implications for Research and Theory 
Overall, the present results demonstrate that advancing understanding of corporate criminal 
prosecution requires properly accounting for the legal realities that influence all aspects of 
organizational functioning and applying agency theory to them. Validating this approach has 
more specific implications for agency theory as well as theoretical perspectives on corporate 
governance. It also highlights the important role that the government and media may play in 
corporate dynamics and performance. 
 
Corporate criminal liability provides a unique and powerful context for validating agency theory 
and, more specifically, agency costs. Scholars have criticized agency theory because its key 
premise of homogeneity of shareholder interests often fails to hold as a result of differential 
prioritization of financial and social concerns (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). In the context of 
criminal prosecutions, however, these concerns overlap because convictions have negative 
implications for both financial and social performance. Consequently, all shareholders, albeit for 
potentially different underlying reasons, respond negatively to prosecutions. This reality enables 
the present findings to robustly defend agency theory from two additional criticisms. First, they 
demonstrate the explanatory and predictive validity that others have accused agency theory of 
lacking (Ghoshal, 2005; Perrow, 1986). Second, the fact that shareholders bear these costs 
reaffirms the traditional view that they, rather than other stakeholders (Chassagnon & Hollandts, 
2014; Garoupa, 2000; Lan & Heracleous, 2010), are truly the principals of the firms. 
 
According to theories of crime (Becker & Stigler, 1974), corporate governance (Dalton et al., 
2007), and shareholder activism (Goranova & Ryan, 2014), the potential for sanctions to lead to 
actual deterrence depends on expected costs. Indeed, current enforcement strategies are 
predicated on this principle (Miceli & Segerson, 2007). By improving the measurement of the 
costs of criminal prosecutions and showing how temporal dispersion hides them, the present 
results reveal how systematic regulatory practices and policies intended to encourage corporate 
governance may actually undermine it. Determining whether this is so would require future 
researchers to do two things. First, they would need to assess how well shareholders and their 
representatives (e.g., directors) estimate the actual costs of criminal prosecutions. Second, they 
would need to identify the threshold those costs would have to reach to mobilize shareholders to 
take the necessary actions (i.e., by way of corporate governance) to avoid experiencing such 
costs again. Given the complexity of such dynamics, future researchers could make theoretical 
contributions by examining the roles of moderators, such as firm size, ownership concentrations, 
investor type (individual vs. institutional), and risk profiles. Finally, there is a great need to study 
how the prosecution of corporate crime affects those who are actually responsible for it (i.e., 
managers; Pozner, 2008) and how those affected individuals respond to and influence the 
prosecution process. 
 
The present research also highlights the need to understand the roles of two ostensible 
stakeholder advocates—the media and the government—in firm performance. Both entities are 
powerful actors who exercise great influence over corporations and their fates (Greve et al., 
2010). Management scholars should, thus, continue to develop their understanding of the 
relationships between the media and corporations (see Bednar, 2012; Westphal & Deephouse, 
2011; Westphal, Park, McDonald, & Hayward, 2012), particularly in the context of corporate 
crime and prosecution thereof. They should similarly work to understand the relationship 
between regulators and firms. Greve et al. proposed a provocative research question that ties 
these themes together and could be addressed using the present methods: 
 
It would be interesting to investigate whether the state pursues offenders of intermediate 
size because they have fewer resources than large firms (and thus are easier to prosecute), 
but draw more media attention than small firms (and thus their defeat offers more 
promise to enhance enforcement officials’ reputations). (83) 
 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 
Federal and state governments collect billions in nontax revenues each year by prosecuting firms 
ostensibly to curb corporate crime. The present results affirm that a substantial portion of these 
funds comes directly out of the pockets of shareholders who have little to no influence over daily 
firm operations (cf. Fama, 1980). Unless it can be shown that these vicarious penalties 
effectively motivate corporate governance and legal compliance, my findings support beliefs that 
prosecuting firms constitutes further injustice in that it transfers the costs of convictions to 
innocent stockholders (principals) instead of their criminal agents (O’Leary, 2007). This 
potential injustice is further perpetuated in that, as a result of frequent changes of ownership, 
stockholders who “pay” for crimes are often not the same as those who benefited from them 
(Tibbs et al., 2011). Unless practitioners and policy makers eliminate moral hazards whereby 
managers can commit crimes and, sometimes literally, buy their way out of jail with company 
resources (see Appelman, 1990, for an example), trends in corporate crime are likely to persist. 
 
Those with the greatest power to change this state of affairs, particularly managers and 
governments, have little incentive to do so. Managers currently gamble with stockholder 
resources to promote their own careers (Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010). Government 
officials also play by contrived rules that favor their interests (Greve et al., 2010; Martin, 1998). 
Given the perverse incentives involved, internal corporate governance remains as the sole 
defense against the ills of corporate crime (Lange, 2008; Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008). 
 
Corporate boards’ composition, structure, and policies influence both financial and social 
performance (e.g., Schnatterly, 2003; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). Actively encouraging 
legal compliance, however, requires that directors remember that corporate crime occurs simply 
because it serves managers’ interests (Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Mishina et al., 2010). Although 
the most effective way to eliminate corporate crime would be to eliminate the perverse incentives 
that encourage it, doing so without inviting other undesirable agency problems is much easier 
said than done. Frey and Osterloh (2005) offered a thorough analysis of this challenge and 
general approaches to meeting it. On the basis of theories of motivation, they argued that fixed-
pay compensation should promote more legally compliant behavior because pay-for-
performance, the classic agency-problem fix, undermines the intrinsic desire to engage in 
prosocial behavior. In addition, they equated legal compliance with cooperation in social 
dilemmas. This analogy suggests the solution may lie even more in public accountability for 
individual actions (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001). If so, boards should promote norms 
and hire managers that favor transparency and individual ownership of decisions, as self-
monitoring and self-regulation depend on the identifiability of employees’ actions. Otherwise, 
corporate prosecutions can offer no real solutions to the enforcement problem (Becker & Stigler, 
1974; Miceli & Segerson, 2007). 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Integrating legal perspectives into organizational research (cf. Lan & Heracleous, 2010) enabled 
me to better characterize the impact of criminal prosecutions on stock performance. Readers can 
be confident in my results, as I accounted for critical issues limiting previous event studies 
(see McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Of particular significance, I have shown that legally imprecise 
models may occlude important information, such as how conviction harbingers factor into 
stakeholder reactions to convictions. These are important advances given the popularity of event 
studies with organizational scholars, particularly for examining the impact of corporate social 
behavior on stock performance (Frooman, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel). Nevertheless, two 
notable factors limit the present research and need to be addressed. 
 
First, my data set included a substantial number of cases overall but relatively few observations 
for some events (e.g., notifications and sentencing). Although small samples are of limited 
concern for the actual results of event-study analyses (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997), they did 
potentially limit statistical power and, thus, the number of variables I could use in the regression 
models that validated my results. This limitation restricted the potential for this study to make a 
larger contribution as substantial variance remains unexplained. Nevertheless, the purpose of 
those models, as prescribed by McWilliams and Siegel, was to legitimize the results of the event 
studies, which they did. Going forward, more insightful theorizing, rather than larger samples, 
may better enable future researchers to explain additional variance as well as why stakeholders 
appear to respond positively to anticipated convictions. 
 
Second, some readers may find my data set to be somewhat dated given that more than a decade 
has passed since the latest event in my sample. Although less than optimal, such lag times 
between the events studied and publication are common in corporate-crime event studies 
(e.g., Murphy et al., 2009). Two other facts should further allay concerns about the age of my 
data. One is that it appears that the general approach of regulators towards corporate crime has 
changed little in the past several decades. I expect therefore that the overall relationships would 
hold for any time period before or since the 1990s. The other is that the time period I used at 
least somewhat overlaps previous studies. Otherwise, readers could speculate that changes in the 
environment explain my findings. Given that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a major overhaul of 
corporate regulation, my study now provides an appropriate baseline for future scholars to 
examine whether and how this major reform affects the realities of corporate crime. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present research provides better ways to measure the agency costs of corporate crime and to 
make sense out of what had previously been puzzling findings. In contrast to conclusions that 
convictions have no negative impact on stock price, the findings reported herein show that they 
do and that the overall cost of prosecutions is much larger than previously estimated. They also 
show that this impact occurs over several critical events during the prosecution process rather 
than one or two broadly defined ones. Given that unresolved puzzles surrounding previous 
results slow research efforts (Pfeffer, 2007), resolving those puzzles opens new paths for future 
researchers to take with this important topic. Indeed, I hope the present findings provoke further 
dialogue and effort towards producing real solutions for the problem of corporate crime. 
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Notes 
 
1.I base my understanding of the criminal prosecution process on summaries published by 
Donald Dripps (2009) and the Offices of the United States Attorney (2014b). 
 
2.The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that only the U.S. federal government must certify 
charges through a grand jury. Nevertheless, some states do as well (Offices of the United States 
Attorney, 2014a). 
 
3.As described by the Offices of the United States Attorney (2015), an arraignment is a hearing 
during which the accused, now called the defendant, officially hears criminal charges and 
responds to them by entering a plea. 
 
4.According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a plea of no contest, or nolo contendere in Latin, 
expresses that “the accused will not contest the facts on which the charge is based as a criminal 
case plea.” Although it results in the accused being found guilty by the court, it has the benefit of 
preventing civil litigants from using those verdicts as evidence in potential lawsuits 
(http://thelawdictionary.org/letter/n/page/28/). 
 
5.The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution establishes that all criminal defendants have the 
right to have their cases decided by “an impartial jury.” Nevertheless, defendants can waive this 
right and opt to have a judge decide their case (also known as a bench trial). I refer to judges and 
juries collectively in this regard as the “court” or “courts.” 
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